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Abstract
Environmental pollution is a serious problem in Middle and
Eastern Europe. Although most Middle and Eastern European
countries since long have established extensive legislation
on environmental issues, they rarely have enforced these
laws. Virtually, they did not persue any effective environ-
mental policy. Only with beginning of political and economic
reforms the dimension of environmental damages has begun to
be recognized, yet awareness has risen rapidly. Due to the
process of political and economic opening, new opportunities
for international cooperation are arising. This paper propo-
ses a policy of internalizing the negative external effects
of environmental pollution as well as the positive external
effects of environmental protection. It takes up the ele-
ments of both the Pigouvian and the Coasean solution to ex-
ternal effects. A tax-subsidy scheme shall be used in the
national context while a bargaining procedure shall be em-
ployed in the context of international cooperation. Subsi-
dized West-East technology transfer will contribute to both
improving environmental quality in all over Europe and to
effectively support the process of reforms in Central-East
Europe.- 4 -
1. Environmental Damage and the Tax-Subsidy Solution to
External Effects
Environmental damages are a prime example for negative glo-
bal technological externalities. Technolgical externalities,
or for short just: externalities, are defined as effects of
production or consumption, whether costs or benefits, which
are unpaid, i.e. transmitted outside the market mechanism.
They are not reflected by relative prices, thus causing
allocative distortions: Activities with negative external
effects are taking place on a level higher than socially op-
timal, while activities with positive external effects are
taking place on a level lower than socially optimal.
In the case of environmental damages, natural resource in-
puts of production like water, air, soil and energy are, un-
derpriced - or oftenly not even priced at all - and there-
fore overused. The notion of using natural resources refers
to reducing both quantity and quality: resources may be used
up in the production process without affecting the quality
of remaining quantities and resources may be used by lowe-
ring their quality, i.e. degrading them by emitting pollu-
tants. Overusing natural resources thus equally refers to
using higher quantities and to emitting more pollutants than
would be socially optimal.
Externalities, both positive and negative, are considered to
be global if many or all other economic agents are concer-
ned. This applies to environmental damages as biophysical
Remark: This paper was first presented at the workshop "East
meets West: New Opportunities for Economic Cooperation",
held by the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy
of Sciences, Prague, and the Institute of World Economics,
Kiel, in Kiel September 3
r -4 , 1991. I am grateful for
discussion, comments and critique from the workshop partici-
pants .
On the concept of external effects see Bohm, Peter (1988);
Mishan, E. J. (1982); Luckenbach, Helga (1986) and
Recktenwald, Horst Claus (1983).- 5 -
mechanisms are transmitting them regardless of regional and
national boundaries. Soil contamination though, may consti-
tute an exception. Like other environmental damages, it re-
presents a negative externality, but only in very rare ca-
ses, it will pass national boundaries and harm adjacent
countries.
Correcting market failures i.e. allocative distortions re-
sulting from external effects is a genuine concern of econo-
mic policy. Standard remedy in this case is the Pigouvian
tax-subsidy solution: taxing, thus discouraging those acti-
vities which are persued on a level higher than socially op-
timal while subsidizing, thus stimulating activities persued
on a level lower than socially optimal. Tax-subsidy inter-
ventions into the market process on these grounds are justi-
fied by welfare economics and compatible with market-type
economic systems. They are adequate policy instruments in
the firmly established Western market economies and may e-
qually be applied in the still to be established Eastern
market economies.
A Pigouvian tax-subsidy scheme may be employed in the natio-
nal context where governments are sovereign with respect to
national economic agents such that they can levy taxes and
pay subsidies. Internationally, where governments are on e-
qual footing the contract solution as proposed by Ronald
Coase (1960) may be feasible. Although property rights to
environmental goods are not well defined as they lack to be
codified - particularly in the international context - they
are determined by the actual state of affairs. Pollutes who
presently are degrading environmental quality can be consi-
dered as being endowed with the right to pollute and their
status quo represents the initial distribution of poverty
rights to environment. Against this background intergovern-
mental transfers can be negotiated for such that those coun-
Pigou, Arthur Cecil (1960).- 6 -
tries interested in improving environmental quality have to
compensate those which presently are enjoying the right to
pollute.
2. The Tax-Subsidy Solution Applied to Global External
Effects: Subsidized Technology Transfer
a) The Economic Policy Proposal
A variant of of the above scetched tax-subsidy scheme may be
suitable to tackle both environmental problems in Eastern
European countries and to effectively support the process of
their economic reforms. Both environmental damage and gene-
ral economic backwardness have common structural causes-,
2
rooted in the system of socialist planning. First, a weak-
ness to implement advanced technologies which results in low
rates of innovation and second, a pattern of investment
which gives priority to expanding capacities rather than im-
proving product quality or process efficiency.
Additional to these causes common to both problems, environ-
mental damage is specifically resulting from former socia-
list growth strategy and price policies. The strategy of ex-
tensive growth, supported by subsidized energy prices, has
led to resource and energy intensive modes of production and
to overexpansion of heavy industry. Finally, neglecting the
environmental issue for decades despite of existing legal
provisions, together with relevant data either lacking or
being concealed, have aggravated the problem.
Maler, Karl-Goran (1990).
o
Gomulka, Stanislaw (1986); Kaser, Michael (1988);
Winiecki, Jan (1986).
3 Botos, Katalin (1990); Hardi, Peter (1989); Notzold,
Jiirgen (1988); Wei|3enburger, Ulrich (1991); Welfens,
Maria (1986) .- 7 -
For these reasons, all routed in the system of socialist
planning, environmental damage in Eastern Europe has occur-
red on a much larger scale than in the West. The resulting
structural differences in environmental quality may be la-
belled the "environmental gap". General economic backward-
ness resulting from socialist planning is reflected by poor
innovation performance and has been called the "technologi-
2
cal gap". As both the environmental and the technological
gap have common structural causes, it should be possible to
design an approach of economic policy which simultaneously
allows to close, at least to narrow both gaps.
Such an approach fully obeys Tinbergen's theorem of effec-
tive economic policy which states that each policy target
needs to be persued by means of one specific policy instru-
ment. Both the technological gap and the environmental gap
between market economies and former socialist economies are
emanating from the same systemic features. Combatting common
causes of - seemingly - two problems constitutes just one
single target of economic policy. Thus closing or narrowing
both gaps can simultaneously be persued by employing the
same or more specifically: by the same number of policy in-
struments .
The Western Contribution
An adequate economic policy, based on international cooper-
ation and designed to tackle the causes of both technologi-
cal and ecological problems should envisage Western govern-
A striking example, by the way, that the social planner
does not properly account for external, hence social cost
as Oskar Lange (1938) supposed him to do.
2
The environmental gap is reported for S02-emissions by
Welfens, Maria (1986) and for C02-emmissions by Gattinger,
Matthias, et. al. (1990).
Though the technological gap is not a problem in itself,
rather the underlying lack of international competitive-
ness is the matter of concern.Q
ments to subsidize Western enterprises which are willing to
transfer environment-improving technology to the East i.e..
to install and to employ it there. These subsidies will sti-
mulate activities which actually are persued on a level lo-
wer than socially optimal. Granting subsidies shall be made
conditional on positive and measurable environmental effects
which have to be realized by each subsidized project. Gene-
rally, environmental improvements can be achieved by either
- repairing environmental damage and/or by
- preventing further damages to occur via
— installing security technology into existing equip-
ment ,
-- replacing old by new equipment which operates less
resource and energy intensive (process innovation),
or by
— establishing new lines of production using technol-
ogies which are fulfilling advanced environmental
standards (product innovation).
The subsidy program should not include all these activities.
It should only.be directed to the users of more environmen-
tal friendly technologies but should exclude their produ-
cers. Producers of environment-protecting technologies are
operating in a specific market, where the benefits of envi-
ronmental improvements are not external but fully internal
to market participants. Any subsidy here would introduce di-
stortions rather than correcting them. The subsidy program
Paying subsidies involves the problem of free-rider ef-
fects. Though free-riding cannot be ruled out, it may be
minimized by an adequate design of the subsidy program.
Anyway, it may be negligible given the low level on which
environment-improving technology transfer actually takes
place.- 9 -
should be targeted to those activities to which environmen-
tal effects virtually are unpaid side-effects, i.e. exter-
nalities. This mostly refers to activities of process inno-
vation, i.e. replacing old machinery by new equipment and to
activities of product innovation, i.e. establishing new li-
nes of production based on advanced technologies.
As the scope of the program will be restricted by available
funds, the criteria of eligibility have to be defined and to
be applied rather strictly in order to prevent that nearly
all activities of Western enterprises in the East will be
eligible. Defining operational criteria and evaluating spe-
cific projects with respect to them are tasks which could be
assigned to existing institutions with the necessary know-
how already at their disposal, e.g. to the ECE (the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe). An institutional
set-up in which a special agency is involved in the provi-
sion of public goods, especially in elaborating a social
cost-benefit analyses and to calculate prices according to
individual agents' marginal benefits corresponds to the
Lindahl mechanism for determining the supply of public goods
and to the related Lindahl equilibrium concept.
Though strict on environmental eligibility criteria, the
program should be open to all modes and channels of techno-
logy transfer which private investors will consider to be
appropriate, i.e. profitable with respect to their indivi-
dual economic rationale. Thus, the task to choose or to ex-
plore the most profitable mode of transfer will be left to
enterprises, i.e. to the market mechanism. Suitable modes of
transferring technology may be foreign direct investments as
well as joint-ventures, both licensing and leasing con-
tracts, transferring technology embodied in modern equipment
as well as rendering consultant services, technical assi-
2 stance and educational training.
""" Maler, Karl-Goran (1985); Siebert, Horst (1987).
2
Boguslawskij, Mark M. et.al. (1990).- 10 -
The program may be funded either directly out of Western go-
vernment budgets or indirectly via public securities espe-
cially issued for this purpose. Thus only interests would
have to be paid out of the budget. The interest rate then
would be the crucial variable in order to calibrate the size
of the program and to - at least roughly - reflect the ex-
pected value of environmental benefits accruing to Western
taxpayers. The interest rate may be the higher the larger
and the more tangible expected improvements of environmental
quality, hence taxpayers
1 assumed willingness to pay will
be. That is, the rate may be the higher the worse actual en-
vironmental damages are and the closer Eastern and Western
regions are linked by biophysical transmission mechanisms.
Once the program's total volume of funds has been determi-
ned, funds have to be allocated among the enterprises which
want to participate. As far as possible, this should be done
by employing devices compatible with market mechanisms. The
first-best device is to auction off the subsidy volume. The
program then would have to be divided into subprograms sui-
table to target specific environmental problems and bids
would have to be invited for these sub-programs. Given that
informational requirements are not prohibitive, enterprises
would have to compete in terms of measurable, prospective
environmental improvement. The most attractive bids would be
awarded with subsidy payments, either in equal amounts or on
a degressive scale.
Particular Eastern and Western regions are differently lin-
ked by biophysical transmission mechanisms, thus differently
concerned by specific environmental problems. For this rea-
son, environmental East-West cooperation should not be
The device of indirectly financing the subsidy programm
illustrates how the Coasean solution to environmental pro-
blems - derived in the context of external economies - can
coincide with the Lindahl solution in the public-good ap-
proach. Siebert (1987) explicitly points out that persona-
lized, i.e. Lindahl prices cannot only be set by a public
environmental agency but also by an auctioneer which means
by a market-type mechanism.- 11 -
relying on large supra-national organizations like the Euro-
pean Community, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) or the
United Nations. Rather, cooperation partners should be choo-
sen according to the spatial dimension of environmental pro-
blems and cooperation should be based on specific bilateral
or multilateral agreements, depending on which Western coun-
try or countries are affected by environmental damages ema-
nating from Eastern neighbour countries. Thus, the partners'
incentives to cooperate are stronger than in groups whose
members are quite differently affected. Transfrontier en-
vironmental externalities can best be internalized through
bilateral cooperation, while international externalities af-
fecting more than two countries should be adressed by means
of multilateral cooperation.
Suitable partnerships e.g. may be established by Austria and
Hungary which jointly are concerned with the Danube water
quality; Germany may cooperate with Poland and Czechoslova-
kia in order to reduce air pollution and countries bordering
the Baltic may cooperate effectively with the Scandinavian
countries as they can assumed to be rather equally intere-
sted in improving the Baltic water quality. For the former
Soviet Union though, it will be difficult to establish bila-
teral or multilateral partnerships because due to her mere
geographic size she has "internalized" a great part of all
domestically caused environmental damages in the sense that
mostly only the Soviet economy itself has been affected. In
her case therefore, it seems necessary to directly involve
the large international organizations in order to achieve
any cooperation agreement. Global cooperation particularly
will be required with respect to the problems of nuclear e-
nergy. Radiation security represents a global, at least an
international environmental good and the Tschernobyl disa-
ster has shown that consequences of nuclear accidents are
although with different intensity - almost worldwide felt.
The recent accident in Sosnowy Bor again has proven the nu-
clear perils' acuteness.
1 Bethkenhagen, Jochen (1988); Hardi, Peter (1989).- 12 -
The Eastern Contribution
Programs of Western subsidies for environment-improving
technology transfer shall be made contingent on an adequate
Eastern contribution which has to comprise two elements. In
the first instance, Eastern governments should be committed
to design liberal regulations conducive to foreign inve-
stors, to define quality and security standards and to vigo-
rously enforce them. Secondly, as a counterpart to Western
subsidies, Eastern governments should set up a corresponding
tax program. Taxes should be imposed on Eastern enterprises
which are continuing to overuse natural resources. Their ac-
tivities shall be discouraged in order to diminish further
environmental damages. Taxing can be effected either by im-
posing new, environment-specific taxes or by cutting still
existing subsidies for energy and natural resource inputs.
Though calling for environment-specific taxes is uncontro-
versial from the perspective of welfare economics, in Ea-
stern governments' political reality their possibilities
to abolish subsidies granted to and/or to impose additional
taxes on enterprises whose profitability is already low or
even negative, will be restricted by the degree in which
additional unemployment is socially and politically toler-
able. Thus tax rates would have to be choosen very deliber-
ately in order to give tangible incentives for reducing en-
vironmental damage on the one hand without causing unduly
high unemployment on the other hand. Recognising this dilem-
ma, the first element of Eastern contribution, namely to
design liberal regulations conducive to Western investors,
may be dominating the second one. Foreign investors and the
inflow of foreign capital are urgently needed in nearly all
sectors of the Eastern economies. Nevertheless it seems to
be necessary and possible to give preferential treatment to
Comprehensive tax reform is a necessary component of
transforming the economic system. On this occasion, the
aspect of environmental taxes should be included into the
reform discussion.- 13 -
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those investment projects which would perceptibly improve
environmental quality.
Foreign investors are not only needed for the investments
they bring but also for the market-know how they possess.
Their knowledge and their experiences of how to operate un-
der market conditions will virtually support the process of
marketization in the Eastern economies. The benefits of
market-know how are internalized by foreign investors only
as far as they translate into their profits. But they are
external to them as far as their knowledge can successfully
be transferred to and applied by Eastern entrepreneurs - an
externality which again makes the case for subsidizing fo-
reign investors' activities, this time though on part of the
Eastern governments. Tax holidays may be considered as the
adequate policy instrument.
b) The Economic Policy Rationale
The proposed tax-subsidy scheme combines both
cooperation on the government level with cooperation on
the enterprise level and
the "polluter-pays principle" with a restricted form of
"beneficiary-pays principle".
Cooperation on the government level shall ensure that market
failure resulting from externalities is corrected by inter-
nalizing external benefits via subsidies and external costs
For a general discussion of payment principles in the con-
text of international environmental problems see Maler,
Karl-Goran (1990). On the relevance of different payment
principles in the specific context of Eastern European en-
vironmental damages see Bethkenhagen, Jochen (1988);
Christie, Ian (1988) and Weipenburger, Ulrich (1991) .- 14 -
via taxes. National governments are cooperating as to nego-
tiate the basic agreements. Payments then are taking place
within each national economy; either out of the state budget
towards domestic enterprises in the case of subsidies or vi-
ce versa, from enterprises to their national authorities in
the case of taxes. Cooperation on the enterprise level shall
ensure that resources will be allocated by market mechanisms
towards the most profitable business opportunities.
The proposed distribution of financial burden adheres partly
to the "polluter-pays principle" and partly to the "benefi-
ciary-pays principle". Eastern polluters causing global ex-
ternal costs shall be forced to pay by Eastern governments,
either in terms of abolished subsidies or in terms of levied
taxes. Western enterprises whose activities are yielding ex-
ternal benefits shall be subsidized and Western citizens be-
nefitting from environmental improvements shall be taxed by
Western governments in order to collect the funds necessary
to endow the subsidy program. Eastern citizens, though e-
qually benefitting from improved environmental quality are
not obliged to make payment contributions. This may be ju-
stified by applying welfare economics to the international,
especially to the political dimension of Eastern transforma-
tion processes. The success of Eastern transformation has to
be considered as an event offering positive external effects
to Western nations not only in terms of economic and ecolo-
gical improvement, but also in terms of political stability.
Successful economic reforms are of first order importance to
ensure internal political stability in the East and Eastern
political stability then will spill over to the West, or
The "beneficiary-pays principle" is identical with the
"victim-pays principle", but for reasons of symmetry the
term "beneficiary-pays principle" appears to be more
appropriate. According to the "polluter-pays principle"
polluters shall pay for the pollution they are causing.
The opposite principle then would demand that beneficia-
ries shall pay for the benefits they are receiving. The
"victim pays principle" though does not demand that vic-
tims shall pay for being victimized, rather they shall pay
for not being victimized any longer.- 15 -
rather: political instability prevented to emerge via len-
ding economic support will not spill over to the Western
countries.
3. Welfare Implications
Environmental East-West cooperation based on subsidized
technology transfer, given that it can be successfully rea-
lized, will yield mutual environmental, economical and poli-
tical benefits. First, environmental benefits will accrue if
eligibility criteria for granting subsidies are adequately
defined and applied. Due to the same biophysical mechanisms
which are transmitting environmental deterioration across
borders, environmental improvements will materialize both in
the East and in the West.
Equally, economic benefits will accrue both to the East and
to the West. In the Eastern economies, benefits will accrue,
firstly in terms of increasing marketization and secondly in
terms of improved economic performance resulting from suc-
cessful marketization. Economic performance will increase as
the transferred technology improves the industrial structu-
re, may create new profitable employment, modernizes the ca-
pital stock, increases efficiency of production and enhances
export capacities via improved competitiveness on interna-
tional markets. Better export performance then allows to re-
duce trade deficits and hard currency debt. Abolishing sub-
sidies and/or levying environmental taxes contributes to re-
duce budgetary deficits. Increasing marketization will re-
sult from the market-know how foreign investors are bringing
in. In the West, economic benefits will accrue via addition-
al profitable investment and business opportunities which
are opened up by the subsidy program. Technological coopera-
tion designed to improve environmental quality, like any
kind of international division of labour, will yield mutual
economic benefits.- 16 -
Finally, mutual benefits also will accrue in political
terms. In the West, success of Eastern reforms has increas-
ingly been acknowledged as a matter of own concern: The de-
gree of stability reforming Eastern countries can maintain
represents one of the factors influencing internal stability
in Western countries. Discussions on large-scale East-West
migration are revealing the Westeners concerns. In the East,
economic improvement constitutes one of the primary object-
ives of reforms and its realization is of utmost importance
in order to ensure actual political stability as well as
further internal and external support for the reform pro-
cess .- 17 -
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